ED19 - Authority Interface Practice: ELSTER, DE-Mail, eXTra - Mediation by GitCover
Problem
Many authority interfaces are regulated by law, but in practice barely usable for laypersons:
- ELSTER: complex, error-prone - the ELSTER interface requires certificates, XML formats, client software - a barrier for laypersons
- DE-Mail: discontinued - DE-Mail was planned as a secure communication channel with authorities, but is officially discontinued (last provider as of 31.12.2026). Archived emails in discontinued systems are no longer accessible - a GoBD-relevant retention problem
- eXTra: unknown - the eXTra format (SV data) is for payroll offices, not for entrepreneurs - but during a DRV audit it suddenly becomes relevant
- Z3 data carrier: specialist knowledge - the GoBD-compliant Z3 export requires specialist software or manual preparation
- Interface errors: not documented - when ELSTER or DE-Mail fail, the error is not logged in the repo - the evidence of "I tried" is missing
- Regulation binding: not assigned - every interface submission is bound to a regulation (e.g. LStA → § 41a EStG), but this assignment is not documented
Core message
The GitCover harness mediates between external systems and risk-affine regulations:
- ELSTER mediation - LStA, UStA, LSt-Bescheinigung via the ELSTER interface; receipt as voucher with sidecar
- DE-Mail: discontinued - migration required - historical DE-Mails must be migrated into the repo as EML + SHA-256 + sidecar before the shutdown; archived emails in discontinued systems are no longer accessible - GoBD retention problem
- eXTra/euBP export - SV data exportable in eXTra format for DRV audits
- Z3 data carrier export - GoBD-compliant Z3 export for FA external audits (git bundle as self-contained archive)
- Interface error logging - errors/aborts of external systems are logged as a repo event
- Regulation binding - every interface transaction is mapped to the risk-affine regulation
Compliance by Design: The harness does not hide the complexity of the authority interfaces - it documents it. Every submission, every receipt, every error is traceably recorded in the repo.
The authority interface landscape
| Interface | Purpose | Complexity | GitCover mediation |
|---|---|---|---|
| ELSTER | LStA, UStA, LSt-Bescheinigung, e-invoice viewer | high (certificate, XML, client) | Receipt as voucher with sidecar |
| DE-Mail | Secure communication with authorities | discontinued (last provider 31.12.2026) | Migration: EML + sidecar into the repo; warning |
| eXTra/euBP | SV data for DRV audits | high (specialist format) | Export from repo data |
| Z3 data carrier | GoBD-compliant export for FA external audit | high (specialist software) | git bundle as self-contained archive |
ELSTER mediation
| Step | Action | GitCover implementation |
|---|---|---|
| LStA calculated | Wage tax return from payroll | JSON artifact in the repo (see ED13) |
| ELSTER submission | Electronically via ELSTER (certificate required) | Harness calls ELSTER |
| Receipt | ELSTER confirms the submission | Receipt as voucher with sidecar |
| Repo entry | LStA with source_sha256 referencing the receipt |
tags: ["lsta", "§41a-estg"] |
| Regulation binding | LStA → § 41a EStG | vorschrift: "§41a-estg" in the artifact |
| Error logging | ELSTER error is logged | Repo event with error description |
Regulation binding: Every interface transaction is mapped to the risk-affine regulation - e.g. LStA → § 41a EStG, UStA → § 18 UStG, LSt-Bescheinigung → § 41b EStG. This makes it traceable which regulation was fulfilled by which submission.
DE-Mail - Discontinued: Migration and Archiving Consequences
DE-Mail is officially discontinued. The project is considered a failure. The last provider (FP Digital Business Solutions GmbH) is discontinuing the service as of 31.12.2026 - after that, DE-Mail is no longer usable and archived emails in these systems are no longer accessible.
| Event | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Telekom discontinues De-Mail | 31.08.2022 | "due to lack of economic viability" |
| 1&1 De-Mail GmbH discontinues | 07.02.2025 | Service no longer reachable |
| § 130a ZPO repealed | 22.12.2025 | De-Mail abolished as a secure transmission channel (BGBl. 2025 I Nr. 349) |
| Federal administration discontinues | July 2024 | mandatory use discontinued |
| Last provider (FP Digital) discontinues | 31.12.2026 | "With this, De-Mail is history" |
| Federal Court of Audit 2021 | 2021 | 2011-2020: ~6,000 De-Mails from authorities, savings ~EUR 3,500, costs >= EUR 6.5 million |
| CCC criticism | 2013 | Linus Neumann (30C3): "Bullshit made in Germany - deliberately built insecure" |
DE-Mail is history: The last provider (FP Digital Business Solutions GmbH) is discontinuing the service as of 31.12.2026. The legal recognition as a secure transmission channel (§ 130a Abs. 4 Nr. 1 ZPO) was repealed on 22.12.2025. The federal administration discontinued mandatory use in July 2024. The Federal Court of Audit's 2021 balance: EUR 6.5 million in costs for ~EUR 3,500 in savings. A "European Business Wallet (EBW)" is planned as the successor.
Consequences for archived emails in discontinued systems
When a DE-Mail provider discontinues its service, immediate GoBD-relevant retention problems arise:
| Problem | Consequence | GoBD reference |
|---|---|---|
| Mailbox no longer accessible | Emails can no longer be retrieved | § 146 Abs. 5 AO ("available at any time") |
| Provider-side deletion | Data is deleted after the shutdown | § 147 Abs. 1 AO (retention obligation 6 years) |
| No export possible | If the provider does not offer an export function, the data is irretrievably lost | GoBD Rz. 146 (traceability) |
| Evidential value lost | DE-Mail-specific confirmations (dispatch/access confirmation) can no longer be verified | Loss of evidence in disputes with authorities |
| No forensic evidence preservation | A layperson can hardly retroactively verify the authenticity of old emails forensically - without the provider infrastructure, the verification data is missing (signature verification, timestamp server, provider logs) | Downgrading of evidential value to "mere PDF copy" |
| Retention period still running | Emails from 2024 must be retained until 31.12.2030 - but the system will be gone in 2026 | GoBD violation due to unavailable retention |
Forensic evidence preservation - hardly recoverable later: DE-Mail-specific evidentiary features (qualified electronic signature of the dispatch and access confirmation, provider timestamp, integrity hash value) can be verified only within the running provider infrastructure. After the shutdown, this verification data is no longer available. A layperson cannot subsequently verify an exported EML file for its DE-Mail-specific authenticity - the signature verification fails due to the missing provider certificate, the timestamp server is offline, the provider logs are deleted. The email loses its status as "legally binding DE-Mail communication" and degenerates into a mere PDF copy with greatly reduced evidential value. Subsequent forensic evidence preservation by an expert would be theoretically possible, but practically hardly feasible - the required provider infrastructure data no longer exists.
Critical warning - migration before shutdown: Entrepreneurs who still have a DE-Mail mailbox must export all relevant emails as EML files before the shutdown and migrate them into the Git repo (EML + SHA-256 + sidecar). After the shutdown, an export is no longer possible - the data is irretrievably lost. This is a GoBD violation if the retention period is still running (6 years from the end of the year, § 147 Abs. 1 Nr. 2/3 AO).
GitCover migration: DE-Mail -> Repo
| Step | Action | Deadline |
|---|---|---|
| Export | Export all relevant emails as EML | before shutdown (at the latest 31.12.2026) |
| SHA-256 | Calculate hash per EML file | during migration |
| Sidecar | .v7g.md per EML with classification |
during migration |
| Filing | EML + sidecar in sources/korrespondenz/ |
during migration |
| Verification | Check completeness (number of emails) | after migration |
Practical tip: The migration should be carried out immediately, not just shortly before the shutdown. Providers may restrict the service early (e.g. no new registrations, restricted export). Those who wait risk data loss.
| Aspect | Problem | GitCover solution |
|---|---|---|
| Status | DE-Mail officially discontinued (last provider 31.12.2026) | Warning: do not use; migration required |
| Cost/benefit | EUR 6.5 million in costs, ~EUR 3,500 in savings (Federal Court of Audit) | git bundle and ELSTER mailbox are free of charge |
| Security | "deliberately built insecure" (CCC, Linus Neumann 2013) | Git + GPG + SHA-256 |
| Legal recognition | § 130a ZPO repealed as of 22.12.2025 | no longer relevant |
| Archiving | archived emails in discontinued systems no longer accessible | Migration: EML + SHA-256 + sidecar into the repo |
| Retention period | emails from 2024 must be retained until 2030 - system gone in 2026 | GoBD violation for non-migrated data |
| Successor | European Business Wallet (EBW) planned | open; GitCover independent |
DE-Mail disaster mitigation: The harness warns when DE-Mail is used (if historical mailboxes still exist) and recommends immediate migration of all relevant emails as EML + sidecar into the repo. After the shutdown (at the latest 31.12.2026), the data is irretrievably lost - a GoBD violation if the retention period is still running. As an alternative for future communication: ELSTER mailbox for tax matters, regular email + sidecar archiving for correspondence.
eXTra/euBP export and Z3 data carrier
| Export | Purpose | Format | Recipient |
|---|---|---|---|
| eXTra/euBP | SV data for DRV audit | eXTra V3.4.0 (XML) | DRV |
| Z3 (git bundle) | GoBD data for FA external audit | git bundle + Manifest + Static-Web (Z3+) | FA |
Practical example: The DRV requests SV data in eXTra format during an operational audit. The harness exports the relevant payroll and SV data from the repo as eXTra XML. The FA requests GoBD-compliant data (Z3) during an external audit - the harness generates a git bundle + Static-Web (Z3+, see ED05). Both exports are generatable from the structured repo data (JSON, sidecars) - no manual preparation needed.
Interface error logging
| Event | Action | GitCover implementation |
|---|---|---|
| Success | Receipt archived | Voucher with sidecar, source_sha256 in the artifact |
| Error | Error logged | Repo event with error description, timestamp, regulation |
| Evidence | "error not attributable to the entrepreneur" | Repo event as evidence during audit |
Important - liability shift: When an interface fails (e.g. ELSTER timeout on the 10th of the month), the error logging in the repo documents that the entrepreneur tried to submit in time. This is evidence for § 152 AO (late filing surcharge) - the entrepreneur can argue that the error was not within their sphere.
Risk leverage
| Today (cheap) | Tomorrow (audit-proof) | Risk mitigated |
|---|---|---|
| ELSTER receipt as voucher with sidecar | Submission demonstrable | Late filing surcharge § 152 AO |
| DE-Mail warning + alternative | Suitable channel chosen | Loss of communication |
| eXTra export from repo data | SV data available for DRV audit | GoBD violation during DRV audit |
| Z3 export as git bundle | GoBD data available for FA audit | GoBD violation during FA audit |
| Interface error logging | Evidence of "attempted" | Liability shift in case of interface failure |
| Regulation binding | Regulation documented per submission | Denial of regulation fulfilment |
Harness requirement (preview)
Derivable from ED19:
| ID | Requirement | Priority |
|---|---|---|
| FA-12.1 | ELSTER mediation: LStA, UStA, LSt-Bescheinigung; receipt as voucher with sidecar | MUST |
| FA-12.2 | DE-Mail/De-Mail bridge: EML + SHA-256 + sidecar; sender verification | SHOULD |
| FA-12.3 | eXTra/euBP export: SV data in eXTra format for DRV audits | SHOULD |
| FA-12.4 | Z3 data carrier export: GoBD-compliant Z3 export (git bundle) | SHOULD |
| FA-12.5 | Interface error logging: errors as repo event | MUST |
| FA-12.6 | Regulation binding: every transaction mapped to the risk-affine regulation | SHOULD |
| FA-12.7 | DE-Mail disaster mitigation: warning for unsuitable channels | NICE |
| FA-12.8 | Authority identifier registry | MUST |
The complete requirements list in Harness-Anforderungen.md.
Sources
- AO (§ 147 Abs. 6 - data access Z1/Z2/Z3, § 152 - late filing surcharge)
- EStG (§ 41a - wage tax return, § 41b - wage tax certificate)
- UStG (§ 18 - VAT advance return, § 14 - e-invoicing)
- SGB IV (§ 28p - DRV operational audit, § 28a - DEÜV notifications)
- GoBD (BMF letter, Rz. 147 - verifiability, Z3 data access)
- DE-Mail (Wikipedia, as of 14.08.2026) - "With this, De-Mail is history": Telekom 31.08.2022, 1&1 07.02.2025, § 130a ZPO repealed 22.12.2025, federal administration July 2024, FP Digital 31.12.2026, Federal Court of Audit 2021
- BGBl. 2025 I Nr. 349 - Act repealing § 130a Abs. 4 Nr. 1 ZPO (DE-Mail)
- Federal Court of Audit annual report 2021 - DE-Mail: EUR 6.5 million in costs, ~EUR 3,500 in savings
- CCC 30C3 2013 - Linus Neumann: "Bullshit made in Germany"
AFJD/agents/(anonymized) - SSoT concept with ELSTER, interface error logging
Source topology and CDN reference links
| Role | Location | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Primary / SSoT | git.gitcover.org/GCC | Canonical storage (GPG-signed, versioned) |
| Public OSS Mirror / CDN | codeberg.org/gitcover-commons | Read-only mirror; FLOSS discovery |
| Community Hub | github.com/gitcover-commons | Issues & Discussions; source code reference to Codeberg |
Note: This assignment of sources, mirror and community hub reflects the current state and may change. Please check the respective canonical source on gitcover.org for the current state.